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STS441 Giulio B. et al.
                  analyze the correlation. In section 7 we study whether bank-affiliated funds
                  acquired more risky sovereign bonds than their unaffiliated peers during the
                  sovereign debt crisis, and in section 8 we focus on whether banks with affiliated
                  funds sold off more risky bonds during the crisis period compared to other
                  banks. Section 9 reports results from various robustness tests and section 10
                  concludes.

                  2.  Data and sample description
                      For our empirical analysis, we obtain two key data sets: the first is from the
                  Deutsche Bun-desbank’s securities holdings statistics (SHS) and reports the
                  proprietary security holdings of each bank operating in Germany, as well as,
                  for each bank, the aggregate portfolio of all retail customers at the security
                  level. The second data set comprises the security holdings for each investment
                  fund operating in Germany from the investment funds statistics (IFS).
                      The data set for the securities holdings statistics and the investment funds
                  statistics lists the quarterly holdings of banks, its customers and mutual fund
                  companies on a security- by-security basis for the time period Q3 2009 to Q1
                       7
                  2016.  For  our  analysis,  we  exclude  affiliates  of  foreign  banks  operating  in
                  Germany, as well as special-purpose banks, such as development banks.
                      We focus on the holdings of government bonds from the 19 euro-area
                                                                                            8
                  countries and  exclude  from  our analysis  bonds not  denominated  in  euro.
                  These sovereign bonds only account for around 2% of the total, both in the
                  banks’ proprietary portfolios and in the investment funds’ holdings.
                      The first sample we construct focuses on banks’ and their affiliated mutual
                  funds’ sovereign bond holdings. We use a  hand-collected matching list  to
                  match  banks  to  their  affiliated  asset  management  companies,  i.e.  to  asset
                  management companies fully owned by the parent bank, and ultimately to the
                  asset  management  companies’  mutual  funds.  In  doing  so,  we  take  into
                  account changes in the ownership structure of asset management companies
                  that  occurred  during  our  sample  period.  In  total,  19  banks  appear  in  the
                  matched sample. As asset management companies typically own more funds,
                  the median number of fund holdings matched with a single bank holding in
                  the sample is 4, while the average is 7.77. Our data at the fund level also
                  contain an indicator for whether the fund is public (open to retail investors) or
                  special  (dedicated  to  a  specific  institutional  investor).  In  our  sample  of
                  matched holdings, the observations that refer to public funds are just over


                  7  Before September 2009 the investment funds statistics were not available at the security level.
                  8  If we kept non-euro denominatade bonds in the original currency in our data, changes in the
                  nominal holdings would have different magnitudes for diff erent currencies. Alternatively we
                  could convert them into euro. But then exchange rate fluctuations would introduce spurious
                  correlations in the holdings that are unrelated with the trading activity of banks/funds. For these
                  reasons, we drop securities not denominated in euro.
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