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STS441 Giulio B. et al.



                               The fire-sale channels of universal banks in the
                                                                       
                                       European sovereign debt crisis
                                                                               †
                               Giulio Bagattini*, Falko Fecht*, and Patrick Webery
                                     *Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
                                         † Deutsche Bundesbank, DG Statistics

                  Abstract
                  We use a unique security-level data set to analyze correlations in bond trading
                  of banks, their respective retail customers and their affiliated mutual funds.
                  Matching banks’ proprietary holdings with the holdings of their funds and
                  their retail customers for the period 2009-2016 at the security level, we find
                  evidence that banks sold off risky euro-area sovereign bonds to both their
                  retail  customers  and  their  affiliated  mutual  funds  (particularly  their  public
                  funds) during the European sovereign debt crisis. Overall, this enabled banks
                  with affiliated mutual funds to sell off larger amounts of their risky sovereign
                  bond  holdings,  while  bank-affiliated  mutual  funds  acquired  more  risky
                  sovereign  bonds  compared  to  their  unaffiliated  peers.  The  larger  the  risky
                  sovereign bond position a fund acquired from its parent bank, the lower are
                  the  fund’s  short-term  raw  returns  controlling  for  the  risky  bonds  the  fund
                  overall acquired. Our findings show that banks use their customers portfolio
                  and  their  affiliated  funds  as  liquidity  provider  when  they  sell  off  their  risk
                  bonds without paying the funds the ad-equate liquidity premium. On the one
                  hand, this points to a severe conflict of interest between banks’ own account
                  trading and their asset and wealth management services. On the other hand,
                  it  highlights  that  the  severity  of  fire-sale  contagion  depends  on  the
                  organizational structure of the financial sector.




                    We would like to thank Tarun Ramadorai, Linda Goldberg, Dragon Tang, Jens Christensen,
                  Milos Bozovic, Corinna Woyand and Christian Buschmann (discussants), conference participants
                  at the 11th LSE Annual Paul Woolley Centre Conference, the 18th Annual FDIC Bank Research
                  Conference, the FSB-CBoI Research Workshop on Non-bank Financial Intermediation, the 14th
                  Annual Central Bank Conference on the Microstructure of Financial Markets, the EFA 2018, the
                  EEA 2018, the 21st Annual Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, the
                  Belgrade  Young  Economists  Conference,  the  Universität  Augsburg-Deutsche  Bundesbank-
                  Universität  Wien  7th  Workshop Banks  &  Financial  Markets,  and seminar  participants  at  the
                  Deutsche Bundesbank, the University of St. Gallen, the European Central Bank, the Banque de
                  France, the University College Dublin, University of Hohenheim, the Central Bank of Ireland, and
                  Frankfurt School of Finance & Management for helpful comments and suggestions. We would
                  also like to thank Gabriele Meinert, Christoph Fricke and the Division Securities and Money
                  Market Statistics. The paper represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily
                  reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank or the Eurosystem.
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