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STS543 Muizz A. et al.
            distribution of income of approved borrowers, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
            test (Tzur-Ilan, 2018).
                Second, prospective borrowers who were able to obtain financing after the
            implementation of the policies, may have opted to take on a smaller loan that
            is more in line with their affordability. Consequently, we expect borrowers’ DSR
            for  personal  financing  and  residential  property  loan  to  decline  after  the
            implementation  of  the  policies.  To  measure  this  impact,  we  estimate  the
            following regression using ordinary least squares for personal financing and
            residential property loan borrowers, respectively (Bekkum et al., 2019):

                            ,,  =  +  +  +  ,,       (1)
                                   
                                                    ,
                                              

                                                            ∗
                 ,,  =  +   +   +    +  +  ,,   (2)
                                                                    
                                                
                                                                          ,
                                        2
                                                     3
                        
                                                            
                            1
                                    

            where    indexes  individual  borrowers,    indexes  state  of  residence,  and  
            indexes time (quarters). The dependent variable,  ,, , is the borrower’s DSR.
              is  a  policy  index,  which  would  increase  by  1  if  a  new  tightening
                  
            measure is introduced and decline by 1 if a measure is relaxed (Cerutti et al.,
            2017). However, it is important to note that no relaxation of measures took
            place during the period of estimation. The state fixed effects ( ) control for
                                                                           
            fixed differences across regions, such as housing affordability. We also control
            for changes in the overnight policy rate (OPR) as this may have a direct impact
            on the borrowers’ DSR.   is a vector of control variables measured at the
                                     ,
            borrower-level,  and  ,,  the  error  term.  The  main  parameter  of  interest,  β,
            measures the average borrowers’ DSR in the period after the implementation
            of the policies relative to  (unconstrained) borrowers acquiring loans in the
            period before. We also estimate equation (2) to investigate the impact of the
            policies on the low-income group.
                For  home  buyers  that  were  impacted  by  the  policies,  they  may  have
            adjusted their housing choices by buying cheaper houses that may be smaller,
            farther from the city centre or in a lower quality neighbourhood compared to
            the average borrower. To measure this, we estimate equation (1) and (2) with
            house price as the dependent variable.

            4.  Results
            A.  Changes in the Distribution of Borrower Characteristics
                From  the  Kolmogorov-Sminov  test,  we  found  that  the  distribution  of
            income  of  newly-approved  borrowers  is  statistically  different  after  the
            implementation of the policies, for  both personal financing and residential
            property loan (Chart 5 and 6). Notably, the average income of the population
            is higher after the introduction of the measures. This is within expectations -
            with  the  improvement  in  loan  affordability  assessment  which  takes  into


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