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IPS169 Markku L.
                  viewed  by  many  as  untrustworthy,  there  appears  to  be  something  almost
                  insulting or  arrogant about them. Reducing social  and  economic  issues to
                  numerical aggregates and averages seems to violate some people’s sense of
                  political  decency”  (Davies  2017).  Ultimately,  Davies  (2017)  argues,  the
                  declining  trust  in  quantitative  expertise  would  be  unlikely  to  improve
                  democracy, as the critics would like to claim, but to “an unleashing of tabloid
                  editors  and  demagogues  to  provide  their  own  ‘truth’  of  what  is  going on
                  across society.”
                      The virtues of trust are numerous and incontestable. Research has shown
                  its value for a  wide range of economic and social processes: interpersonal
                  relations  and  economic  exchange  (Dasgupta  1988),  financial  investments
                  (Kalkbrenner & Roosen 2016, 62), the legitimacy of political power (Tait 2011),
                  societal and economic development and growth (Gallucio 2018), innovation,
                  education, rule of law, good governance, reduction of corruption and violence,
                  subjective well-being (Zak  & Knack  2001; Laurent 2009, 14; Volland 2017),
                  environmental performance and the propensity to adopt strict environmental
                  policies (e.g. Owen & Videras 2008; Tjernström & Tietenberg 2008; Carattini
                  et  al.  2015),  and  successful  cohabitation  of  peoples  in  multinational
                  democracies (Karmis & Rocher 2018).
                      However,  the  dim  views  of  Davies  concerning  the  loss  of  trust  merit
                  nuancing. Firstly, Desrosières (2015) traces the origins of the crisis of trust back
                  to the “feedback” of indicators and quantitative information on their users and
                  producers, and the tensions this generates for the identity of statisticians. The
                  very  identity  of  statisticians  rests  on  their  role  as  custodians  of  objective,
                  incontestable data in defence of democracy and the underprivileged, yet such
                  quantified forms of information have performative effects (e.g. Merry 2016;
                  Ràfols 2019), that is, they “change the world through their very existence, their
                  circulation  and  their  rhetorical  usage  in  science,  politics  or  journalism”
                  (Desrosières  2015,  334).  Through  institutionalisation  –  a  largely  invisible
                  process  whereby  indicators  become  objectified,  as  the  quantification  and
                  encoding  procedures  become  routine  (ibid.)  -  indicators  become  a  lingua
                  franca  that  allows  smooth  communication  amongst  actors  (ibid.).  Making
                  these processes explicit may be highly desirable for the sake of democracy
                  and openness, yet it also risks weakening the argumentative effectiveness of
                  indicators: the underlying conventions and assumptions would be opened up
                  to  contestation,  and  would  probably  require  lengthy  discussions  and
                  demonstrations (Desrosières 2015, 341).
                      Secondly,  a  distinction  should  be  made  between  the  main  clients  of
                  statistical offices, the ‘users’ of indicators and statistics, who usually share the
                  mental frameworks and objectives of statisticians. These users usually hold
                  strong trust in official statistics, and have experience-based reasons for doing
                  so. The argument put forward by Davies concerns primarily the vast majority

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