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IPS169 Markku L.
            degree  of  trust/mistrust  in  numbers  is  shaped  by  our  perceptions  of  the
            trustworthiness of institutions responsible for upholding such a culture, as well
            as by our everyday encounters with and perceptions concerning individuals
            working within those institutions. Likewise, the greater our buy-in regarding
            an indicator culture, the more prone we are to trust an individual statistician
            or the statistical office he/she represents, and – by implication – the products
            of that institution. Indicator culture is deeply institutionalised, for example in
            the strong particularised social trust amongst the indictor user and producer
            communities.
                Past  and  present  indicator  work  also  involves  choices  and  judgements
            between trust in state planning and market competition, respectively. While
            indicators can be mistrusted for the excessive power they grant to technocratic
            control,  they  are  today  increasingly  blamed  for  fostering  the  intrusion  of
            market and private-sector logics into the public sphere. Ràfols (2019) talks
            about the “political economy of quantitative evaluation increasingly shaped
            by  commercial  information  infrastructures”,  and  about  an  “ongoing
            managerial  push  for  standardization  via  ‘platforms’  run  by  commercial
            oligopolies”.

            3.  Downsides of trust
                In  his  analysis  of  STI  indicators,  Ràfols  (2019)  implicitly  addresses  the
            potential downsides of trust and virtues of mistrust. He identifies three false
            ideological assumptions underpinning STI policy and indicator work. Not only
            are STI policy and indicators grounded in the assumption that “STI eventually
            lead  to  positive  outcomes”  –  hence,  the  more  STI  knowledge  created,  the
            better, but it is also founded on 1) institutional trust in the benevolence of the
            state bureaucracy in supporting STI, and hence in its aim of fostering general
            well-being, and 2)  social (interpersonal) trust in the “scientists and experts
            responsible for developing and applying STI”, as purveyors of “the public good
            rather than particular interests” (Ràfols 2019, 9).
                Ràfols acknowledges that the rather naïve view about STI for the public
            good may have been a reasonable representation in some limited areas in the
            past,  such  as  “when  indicators  were  used  to  challenge  the  scientific
            establishment, particularly in low-trust countries with a tradition of nepotism”.
            Yet, such a highly optimistic view has given way to warranted scepticism. If
            one takes seriously the argument of Merry (2016) about the neglect of “the
            social  aspect  of  indicators…  in  the  face  of  trust  in  numbers,  cultural
            assumptions  about  the  objectivity  of  numbers,  and  the  value  of  technical
            rationality”,  then  mistrust  of  this  kind  of  an  indicator  culture  should  be  a
            healthy  and  welcome  phenomenon,  which  might  help  to  bring  about  a
            different, more reflexive and deliberative indicator culture.
                The downsides of trust are indeed well covered in social science literature.

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