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STS543 Veronica B. B. et al.
                  commitment. The study considers a specification that considers the sum of
                  one lag to four quarter lag effects to capture the total effects in t as seen in
                  equation  1.  In  the  exercise,  the  propagation  of  the  effects  of  changes  in
                  domestic macroprudential policy to changes in loan commitment is significant
                  across different regression models up to four quarters.
                      Do responses to a macroprudential shock differ by type of banks? This
                  section looks at the difference between domestic U/KBs and TBs responses to
                  a macroprudential shock. In the database, there are 101 respondent banks, 38
                  of which are U/KBs and the remaining 63 are TBs. However, only 56 banks
                  consistently reported residential property loans granted on a quarterly basis
                  from the first quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2017. Hence, data of
                  these 56 banks are used in all regression models.
                      To  test  for  the  difference,  interaction  terms  that  are  the  product  of
                  macroprudential  policy  indicator  and  bank-specific  characteristic  X  are
                  included as seen in equation 2,

                       ∆ log  ,  =  + ∑  =1  ∆ log  ,−  + ∑  =1   ∆ −  +  ,−1  +
                                                                     
                                               
                                      
                                ∑    ∆  ∗   +   +    (eq. 2)
                                 =1    −  ,−1         ,  ,

                      The test is on the overall significance of ∑  =1    .  This approach builds on
                  the bank lending channel literature. In order to discriminate between loan
                  supply  and  loan  demand  movements,  the  literature  has  focused  on cross-
                  sectional  differences  between  banks.    Following  Gambacorta  (2005),  this
                  equation  relieson  the  hypothesis  that  certain  bank-specific  characteristics,
                  such  as,  size,  liquidity,  the  deposit-to-totalfunding  ratio  and  capitalization,
                  influence only the loan supply movements, while a  bank’s loan demand is
                  independent  of  these  characteristics.  This  approach  basically  assumes  that
                  after  a  prudential  policy  tightening,  the  ability  to  shield  loan  portfolios  is
                  different between highly-capitalized and less-capitalized banks.
                      Do  responses  to  macroprudential  policies  vary  over  monetary  policy
                  conditions?  In this section, additional interaction terms are introduced which
                  combine  macroprudential  policy  indicators  and  monetary  policy  actions
                                                                                   2
                  (measured by the neutral interest rate or NRR based on Taylor rule ).   This is
                  seen in equation 3 as,

                     ∆ log  ,  =  + ∑  =1   ∆ log  ,−  + ∑  =1   ∆ −  + ∑      +
                                     
                                             
                                                                                =0
                                                                   
                                                                                    −
                   ∑    ∆  ∗   +   +   + 
                     =1    −  −1  ,−1         ,  ,
                                                            (eq. 3)


                  2  The neutral interest rate (NRR) is derived as NRR=(10-year average of real 1-year secondary rates)-
                  ((real 1-year secondary rates - real 5-year secondary rates) - (real 1-year secondary average - real 5-year
                  secondary average)).

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